In this paper, we delimit the moments in which, in “Doctrine of the Similar” and in “On the Mimetic Faculty”, reading and Sprache (speech, language, language) are inseparably linked to the category of “non-sensuous similarities.” In this conception, the analogical-proportional representation of traditional mimesis is dislocated by a rhetori- cal conception of symbolic experiences given by different semiotic forms. Moreover, the idealist ground of the symbolic is relocated in the specific area of language, in which the perception of similarities is (...) mediated by the instance of reading under the predominance of the dissimilar. Our fundamental purpose resides in exposing how this production of similarities, in contrast to those of the relational schematism of classical logicism and with the ground of idealistic determination of Kantian aesthetics, shows its paradoxical grounds in the mimetic reading. (shrink)

Se define “iatrofilosofía” como la disciplina traslacional entre la medicina y la filosofía que tiene un doble objetivo, teórico y práctico. Se presenta un modelo de iatrofilosofía práctica aplicado al dolor crónico asociado a depresión y estrés —depresalgia— que expande al ámbito médico general la psicoterapia Fenomenológica, Hermenéutica Dinámica (PHD). Se parte del modelo general de la triada médica — patología (disease), padecimiento (illness) y condición de enfermo (sickness)— y, en el horizonte de la antropología de Ortega, se proponen cinco (...) metáforas nucleares: avaricia del cuerpo, angustia de circunstancia, desgarro personal, nudos personales y expropiación personal. Estas se relacionan con los mecanismos neurobiológicos de sensibilización central, alostasis y alteración del eje hipotálamo-hipófisis-suprarrenal. Se propone un proceso de recuperación personal basado en la concordia terapéutica. El análisis del dolor crónico y de otros problemas complejos de salud puede beneficiarse de metodologías filosóficas como la hermenéutica clínica. (shrink)

Is practical reason a cognitive faculty? Do practical judgments make claims about a subject matter that are appropriately assessed in terms of their agreement with that subject matter? According to Kantians like Christine Korsgaard, the answer is no. To think otherwise is to conflate the theoretical and the practical, the epistemic and the ethical. I am not convinced. In this paper, I motivate my skepticism through examination of the very figure who inspires Korsgaard’s rejection of cognitivism: Kant. For as I (...) read him, Kant does not construe the distinction between theoretical and practical reason in terms of a distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive faculties but in terms of two distinct applications of a single faculty of reason, which is through-and-through cognitive. Thus, practical, no less than theoretical, reason cognizes a subject matter, and so practical, no less than theoretical, reason is straightforwardly subject to familiar epistemic standards of truth, warrant, and knowledge. Of course, even if I am right about Kant, this does not show that Korsgaard is wrong about reason; and I will offer no direct argument against her position here. Nonetheless, I believe that reflection on Kant’s true view, with its careful treatment of and respect for both the practicality and rationality of reason, should perhaps lead us to rethink what it means to be a rationalist in ethics. (shrink)

I offer a qualified defence of Kant’s natural teleological argument, that is, his inference from the (un)naturalness of an act to its (im)morality. Though I reject many of Kant’s conclusions, I think the form of argument he uses to support these conclusions is not as wrong-headed as it might at first appear. I consider and answer two objections: first, that the argument is inconsistent with Kant’s moral rationalism; and second, that the argument is inconsistent with post-Kantian developments in science. I (...) argue that both objections rest on a common mistake, namely, the assumption that the account of (human) nature on which Kant’s argument relies is theoretical. On the contrary, the relevant account is practical: informed by science, but not determined by it. Once we appreciate the practical character of Kant’s naturalism, we can see not only that Kant can be a naturalist and a rationalist, but contemporary Kantians can be as well. (shrink)

Traditionally, Kantian ethics has been thought hostile to agents' well-being. Recent commentators have rightly called this view into question, but they do not push their challenge far enough. For they leave in place a fundamental assumption on which the traditional view rests, viz., that happiness is all there is to well-being. This assumption is important, since, combined with Kant’s rationalism about morality and empiricism about happiness, it implies that morality and well-being are at best extrinsically related. Since morality can only (...) make our lives go well by making us happy, and since morality can only make us happy by influencing our sensibility, morality is not its own reward--not really. It is simply the condition for some separate benefit. Drawing on Kant’s underappreciated discussion of self-contentment, an intellectual analog of happiness, I reconstruct an alternative account of morality’s relation to well-being. Morality does make our lives go well--and so is its own reward--not because it makes us happy but because it makes us self-contented. (shrink)

This paper presents a graffito written after firing on a Samian-ware bowl dated to the turn of the first and second centuries c.e., which seems to contain part of a hexameter included in the well-known anthology Carmina XII sapientum, the composition of which has recently been attributed to the Christian author Lactantius.

El currículo de Geografía e Historia en Secundaria.

According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. Drawing (...) on underappreciated elements of Kant’s moral psychology, I sketch an alternative form of rationalism, according to which moral activity is by nature pleasant because at least some pleasures are by nature rational. (shrink)

Research Integrity (RI) is high on the agenda of both institutions and science policy. The European Union as well as national ministries of science have launched ambitious initiatives to combat misconduct and breaches of research integrity. Often, such initiatives entail attempts to regulate scientific behavior through guidelines that institutions and academic communities can use to more easily identify and deal with cases of misconduct. Rather than framing misconduct as a result of an information deficit, we instead conceptualize Questionable Research Practices (...) (QRPs) as attempts by researchers to reconcile epistemic and social forms of uncertainty in knowledge production. Drawing on previous literature, we define epistemic uncertainty as the inherent intellectual unpredictability of scientific inquiry, while social uncertainty arises from the human-made conditions for scientific work. Our core argument—developed on the basis of 30 focus group interviews with researchers across different fields and European countries—is that breaches of research integrity can be understood as attempts to loosen overly tight coupling between the two forms of uncertainty. Our analytical approach is not meant to relativize or excuse misconduct, but rather to offer a more fine-grained perspective on what exactly it is that researchers want to accomplish by engaging in it. Based on the analysis, we conclude by proposing some concrete ways in which institutions and academic communities could try to reconcile epistemic and social uncertainties on a more collective level, thereby reducing incentives for researchers to engage in misconduct. (shrink)

My aim in this essay is to reorient our understanding of the Kantian ethical project, especially in relation to its assumed rivals. I do this by considering Kant's relation to eudaimonism, especially in its Aristotelian form. I argue for two points. First, once we understand what Kant and Aristotle mean by happiness, we can see that not only is it the case that, by Kant's lights, Aristotle is not a eudaimonist. We can also see that, by Aristotle's lights, Kant is (...) a eudaimonist. Second, we can see that this agreement on eudaimonism actually reflects a deeper, more fundamental agreement on the nature of ethics as a distinctively practical philosophy. This is an important result, not just for the history of moral philosophy but for moral philosophy as well. For it suggests that both Kantians and Aristotelians may well have more argumentative resources available to them than is commonly thought. (shrink)

El libro centroamericano de los muertos de Balam Rodrigo es un retrato del terrible viaje que realizan los migrantes centroamericanos al pasar por México. Este oscila entre el verso y la prosa poética, así como en la narrativa, pues en ocasiones los poemas cuentan historias de muerte y desamparo de una persona en particular. Aunado a esto se encuentran los encabezados o extractos de notas periodísticas que titulan algunos poemas o se mezclan con los versos. Así, la naturaleza del libro (...) de Rodrigo es híbrida. Por ello en el presente artículo se analiza cómo es que el lenguaje perteneciente al mundo no-poético, se fusiona con los versos y crea metáforas y significados que van más allá de sus propias páginas. Lo cual hace que el lector sienta el dolor y angustia de los migrantes y se vuelva consciente de esta realidad. Esto se descubre al rastrear las fuentes originales de los extractos periodísticos, respetando el orden que da el autor. Como resultado se obtienen mapas espaciales y temporales, que exigen al lector conocer a fondo la causa que los propios versos gritan. (shrink)

A Review of Paul Bloomfield's book _The Virtues of Happiness: A Theory of the Good Life_ (OUP 2014).

RESUMEN En este artículo se presenta una reflexión crítica de la propuesta ética liberal de Charles Taylor y su viabilidad en el contexto político de las sociedades liberales actuales. Una conformación social y política liberal se entiende como aquella donde se promueven y se defiende mayores libertades en esquemas de derechos individuales junto con la exigencia del respeto a esas garantías individuales. Sin embargo, el contexto político liberal, siendo el más idóneo en las sociedades actuales, presenta varios problemas éticos que (...) Taylor ya ha identificado como malestares de la modernidad, tales como el exceso de individualismo, la primacía de la razón instrumental y la fragmentación y polarización de la sociedad. Ante estos retos y conflictos que surgen por el propio liberalismo, la ética de Taylor es una alternativa posible para comprenderlos y gestionarlos desde un civismo ético y la promoción de metas comunes. ABSTRACT This article presents a critical reflection on the liberal ethical proposal of Charles Taylor and its viability in the political context of current liberal societies. A liberal social and political configuration is understood as one in which greater liberties are promoted and defended in individual rights schemes together with the requirement of respect for those individual guarantees. However, the liberal political context although the most suitable in current societies, presents several ethical problems that Taylor has already identified as the malaise of modernity: excess of individualism, primacy of instrumental reason and fragmentation and polarization of the society. Faced with these challenges and conflicts arising from the liberalism itself, Taylor's ethics is a possible alternative to understand and manage them from an ethical civility and the promotion of common goals. (shrink)

: All known life requires phosphorus (P) in the form of inorganic phosphate (PO43x or Pi) and phosphate-containing organic molecules. Pi serves as the backbone of the nucleic acids that constitute genetic material and as the major repository of chemical energy for metabolism in polyphosphate bonds. Arsenic (As) lies directly below P on the periodic table and so the two elements share many chemical properties, although their chemistries are sufficiently dissimilar that As cannot directly replace P in modern biochemistry. Arsenic (...) is toxic because As and P are similar enough that organisms attempt this substitution. We hypothesize that ancient biochemical systems, analogous to but distinct from those known today, could have utilized arsenate in the equivalent biological role as phosphate. Organisms utilizing such ‘ weird life ’ biochemical pathways may have supported a ‘ shadow biosphere ’ at the time of the origin and early evolution of life on Earth or on other planets. Such organisms may even persist on Earth today, undetected, in unusual niches. (shrink)

Ask most philosophers for an example of a moral rationalist, and they will probably answer “Kant.” And no wonder. Kant’s first great work of moral philosophy, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, opens with a clarion call for rationalism, proclaiming the need to work out for once a pure moral philosophy, a metaphysics of morals. That this metaphysics includes the first principle of ethics, the moral law, is obvious. But what about the second principles, particular moral laws, such as duties (...) of truthfulness, beneficence, etc.? Are these principles metaphysical too? Many have thought not, since they make essential use of empirical and anthropological considerations. I argue otherwise; the second principles are metaphysical and this matters. I do this by taking seriously the metaphysics of the metaphysics of morals—more specifically, by understanding the metaphysics of morals alongside the metaphysics of nature. For, qua metaphysics, both employ a common two-stage methodology, the first stage of which is wholly a priori but the second stage of which is partly empirical. As I explain, appreciating this common methodology sheds new light on how the second principles are to be established, as well as on the reach of Kant’s rationalism. (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to the current debate about the status of the “Ought Implies Can” principle and the growing body of empirical evidence that undermines it. We report the results of an experimental study which show that people judge that agents ought to perform an action even when they also judge that those agents cannot do it and that such “ought” judgments exhibit an actor-observer effect. Because of this actor-observer effect on “ought” judgments and the Duhem-Quine thesis, talk (...) of an “empirical refutation” of OIC is empirically and methodologically unwarranted. What the empirical fact that people attribute moral obligations to unable agents shows is that OIC is not intuitive, not that OIC has been refuted. (shrink)

According to many of its advocates, one of the main attractions of Kantian moral philosophy is its metaethical innocence. The most interesting argument for such innocence appeals to Kantians' rationalism. Roughly, if moral action is simply rational action, then we do not need to appeal to anything beyond rationality to certify moral judgment. I assess this argument by reflecting on (dis)analogies between moral and logical forms of rationalism. I conclude that the Kantian claim to metaethical innocence is overstated. Kantians cannot (...) avoid substantial metaethical commitments. Or if they can, it is not their rationalism that explains why this is so. (shrink)

This paper examines the influence of internal barriers on the relationship between the organizational capability of stakeholder integration and proactive environmental strategies. We adopt a moderate hierarchical regression model to test the hypotheses using data from a sample of 73 managers in the business education industry. The paper contributes to stakeholder theory by showing that stakeholder integration positively influences the development of proactive environmental strategies when managers perceive internal barriers to the development of such strategies. This article also explores an (...) ethical dilemma—managers may use the stakeholder integration capability to support their own interests rather than to benefit stakeholders. (shrink)

(2001). Two weeks in the Latin American press: An analysis from the newsmaking sociology perspective. World Futures: Vol. 57, Future Trends in Communications Strategies, pp. 453-479.

El presente trabajo se propone analizar el desvío retórico que hace Walter Benjamin en su lectura de la crítica kantiana a la metafísica. En función de ello, mediante una vía de interpretación expositiva, abordaremos cómo se sitúa lo retórico en el marco de una tarea crítica que busca ampliar los dominios transcriptos de la experiencia posible hacia un trasfondo incondicionado, no reducible bajo el ideal sistemático de la _Wissenschaft_ y sus primados de tipo metafísico-gnoseológico. A partir de la exposición de (...) los vínculos entre crítica retórica, _Sprache_ y el uso retórico de figuras teológicas en algunos contextos discursivos de las disquisiciones benjaminianas, arribaremos a las consideraciones finales, en las que planteamos que el desvío retórico de la crítica efectuado por el autor resulta inseparable de una crítica radical al estatuto del discurso filosófico sistemático y a su fundamento de determinación idealista, concebida mediante una reinvención de categorías y problemas estéticos. (shrink)

The concept of responsible ownership was originally developed with reference to large, publicly held firms. However, the relevance of small- and medium-sized closely held firms, such as family firms, in all economies and the specific governance and organisational characteristics of these firms require further examination of the responsible ownership concept and its operationalisation. Based on the existing literature, we define the construct of responsible family ownership to fill this gap in responsible ownership theory. We propose a scale that can be (...) used to assess the responsible family ownership construct in small- and medium-sized family enterprises. The data used in this exploratory study were collected in an ad hoc survey answered by a representative sample of 84 small- and medium-sized family enterprises. The study contributes to the responsible ownership literature by presenting the responsible family ownership construct, a key driver of balance in family and firm systems that is therefore critical to the health of small- and medium-sized family enterprises. In addition, a scale is proposed as a means to operationalise the construct and to derive practical implications for the governance of this kind of firms. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se propone analizar la apropiación que hace Walter Benjamin del criticismo kantiano para la construcción de una filosofía contemporánea venidera. En función de ello, mediante una vía de interpretación expositiva, abordaremos cómo se articula en “Sobre el programa de la filosofía venidera” el pasaje de la crítica a la metafísica hacia una crítica de tipo retórico, considerando los momentos siguientes: la doble articulación del significante Lehre (entendido en su acepción teorético-doctrinal —tal como funciona en el discurso (...) de las filosofías de sistema— o en su fundamento retórico —Lehre como enseñanza, transmisión o comunicación indirecta—), la ampliación del campo de la experiencia concebido en el ámbito de die Sprache y la interpretación de la metafísica crítica en cuanto mitología moderna. A partir de la exposición de estos momentos, arribaremos a las consideraciones finales de que la apropiación de Benjamin del criticismo como punto de partida para la constitución de una filosofía contemporánea venidera, en contraposición con el ideal epistémico de la Lehre entendida bajo una interpretación teórico-doctrinal, resulta inseparable de una crítica radical al estatuto del discurso filosófico sistemático y a su fundamento de determinación idealista. (shrink)

In this paper, we set out to test empirically an idea that many philosophers find intuitive, namely that non-moral ignorance can exculpate. Many philosophers find it intuitive that moral agents are responsible only if they know the particular facts surrounding their action. Our results show that whether moral agents are aware of the facts surrounding their action does have an effect on people’s attributions of blame, regardless of the consequences or side effects of the agent’s actions. In general, it was (...) more likely that a situationally aware agent will be blamed for failing to perform the obligatory action than a situationally unaware agent. We also tested attributions of forgiveness in addition to attributions of blame. In general, it was less likely that a situationally aware agent will be forgiven for failing to perform the obligatory action than a situationally unaware agent. When the agent is situationally unaware, it is more likely that the agent will be forgiven than blamed. We argue that these results provide some empirical support for the hypothesis that there is something intuitive about the idea that non-moral ignorance can exculpate. (shrink)

Happiness can be expressed through smiles. Happiness can also be expressed through physical displays that without context, would appear to be sadness and anger. These seemingly incongruent displays of happiness, termed dimorphous expressions, we propose, represent and communicate expressers’ motivational orientations. When participants reported their own aggressive expressions in positive or negative contexts, their expressions represented positive or negative emotional experiences respectively, imbued with appetitive orientations. In contrast, reported sad expressions, in positive or negative contexts, represented positive and negative emotional (...) experiences respectively, imbued with consummatory orientations. In six additional experiments, participant observers interpreted that aggression displayed in positive contexts signalled happy-appetitive states, and sadness displayed in positive contexts signalled happy-consummatory states. Implications for the production and interpretation of emotion expressions are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper we articulate, partially and from a rhetorical analysis approach, the crucial moments in which reading appears linked to die Sprache in Walter Benjamin's writings. Both reading and die Sprache operate in Benjamin's discourses as a point of synecdochic crystallization for the elaboration of his rhetorical critique, already outlined in his posthumous writings of youth and brought into play in his early and late essays on art criticism. Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator.

ABSTRACTClose relationship partners often respond to happiness expressed through smiles with capitalization, i.e. they join in attempting to up-regulate and prolong the individual’s positive emotion, and they often respond to crying with interpersonal down-regulation of negative emotions, attempting to dampen the negative emotions. We investigated how people responded when happiness was expressed through tears, an expression termed dimorphous. We hypothesised that the physical expression of crying would prompt interpersonal down-regulation of emotion when the onlooker perceived that the expresser was experiencing (...) negative or positive emotions. When participants were asked how they would behave when faced with smiles of joy, we expected capitalization responses, and when faced with tears of joy, we expected down-regulation responses. In six experimental studies using video and photographic stimuli, we found support for our hypotheses. Throughout our investigations we test and discuss boundaries of and poss... (shrink)

Critiques of Western feminists’ attempts to extend claims about gender injustice to the global context highlighted a dilemma facing Western feminists, what I call the global gender justice dilemma. In response to this dilemma, Alison M. Jaggar argues that Western feminists should turn our attention away from trying to resolve it and, instead, toward examination of our own complicity in the processes that produce injustice. I suggest that this kind of approach is helpful in responding to an additional dilemma that (...) confronts the Western feminist, namely the epistemic dilemma. Western feminists can speak for women of the global South and run the risk of distorting those women’s experience and further silencing their voices, or we can refuse to speak and abdicate our responsibilities to address injustice. I argue that we should address this dilemma not by trying to resolve it but by examining our role in the reproduction of epistemically unjust practices. To explain this response, I offer a preliminary account of epistemic injustice as epistemic oppression. I conclude by claiming that our own epistemic complicity in epistemically oppressive social practices is a weighty reason for us to work to transform those practices. (shrink)

Responsible family ownership is a combination of the family’s commitment to the family-firm’s stakeholders in the long term and the explicit behaviour of the family members associated with the firm. However, families are not individuals but rather a system of relationships among family members. In such a context, misunderstandings in communication, anachronistic mentalities and different value systems can block the intergenerational transmission of RFO. Consequently, the responsibility of the family towards the FF’s stakeholders may be damaged and the firm’s socially (...) responsible behaviour hindered. This paper aims to identify how RFO is transferred across generations and to ascertain the role that family social capital plays in preserving the transmission of RFO from generation to generation. Our research is based on three in-depth case studies of Mexican family-owned small- and medium-sized enterprises. First, the paper identifies and contrasts a set of FSC-specific factors and problems which play a relevant role in the transmission of RFO while recognizing the influence of the mutually reinforcing dynamics of FSC dimensions. Secondly, the family’s honourableness :751–767, 2013) is identified as a key driver for sustaining the transmission of RFO. Finally, the paper identifies RFO institutionalization required to face the intrinsic problems of transmitting RFO in growing families. (shrink)

We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections (...) than a comparable system with plurality rule. (shrink)

Over the last two decades, corporate sustainability has been established as a legitimate research topic among management and organization scholars. This introductory article explores potential avenues for advances in research on corporate sustainability by readdressing some of the fundamental aspects of the sustainability debate and approaching some novel perspectives and insights from outside the corporate sustainability field. This essay also sketches out how each of the six articles of this special issue contribute to the literature by going back to some (...) of the conceptual roots of sustainability and/or by offering novel perspectives for research on corporate sustainability. As these six articles and the outlook on future research opportunities show, broadening the inquiry of corporate sustainability in terms of topics, theories, and methodologies holds considerable potential to improve our understanding of how decision makers and organizations respond to sustainability. (shrink)

In Women’s Activism, Feminism, and Social Justice, Margaret McLaren develops and argues for a new theoretical framework, the feminist social justice approach, that can guide ongoing feminist transnational solidarity projects. I briefly map out the main lines of argumentation in McLaren’s book and highlight some of the valuable contributions these arguments make to the intersecting sub-fields of global ethics, global justice, development ethics, and feminist philosophy. I then note two critical thoughts on the book. First, I argue that McLaren’s concessions (...) to rights discourse as a valuable tool for transformative activism undermine and potentially even contradict her own strong critique of rights discourse. Second, I argue that McLaren doesn’t explicitly or develop the latent social epistemology of her feminist social justice approach and discussions of “training” and “education” potentially run counter to this promising but again latent social epistemology. (shrink)

En las páginas que siguen, vamos a realizar una lectura política del pensamiento de Derrida, dirigiendo nuestra atención, primero, a la deconstrucción de la escritura para centrarnos en el significado político de la différance , segundo, a la institución filosófica como vehículo de elaboración y transmisión del saber y, tercero, a lo que el pensador francés ha reunido bajo el rótulo figuras de lo imposible , con especial atención a la hospitalidad, la responsabilidad y la justicia.

RESUMENEl presente trabajo, I premio de la II Olimpiada de filosofía de Málaga organizada por FICUM, pretende mostrar la importancia de una actitud filosófica en el marco social como garante de la libertad individual. Para ello se ha considerado en primer lugar el carácter intrínsecamente filosófico del ser humano pasando, posteriormente, a defender su presencia en lo social.PALABRAS CLAVEFILOSOFÍA, SOCIEDAD, LIBERTAD, INDIVIDUALIDAD.